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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
THE LAW OF JOINT ADVENTURES
By FRANK L. MECHEM*
N o one who has had occasion to study the general development
of commercial associations can fail to be impressed by the
rapidity with which the "joint adventure" has assumed a place
of prominence in our legal system. At the present time this
newcomer is clamoring, and not without success, for recognition as
a legal relationship sui generis. In decisions, digests, texts, and
other collections of legal literature there are classifications of as-
sociations in which joint adventure is accorded a niche of its own,
like corporations, partnerships, etc., and the natural inference
from this procedure is that we are setting up a body of new law
for the administration of joint adventures.'
Contrasted with this, however, there are the assertions of texts
and a great many decisions that joint adventurers are governed
by substantially the same rules of law as partners, and that a joint
adventure is practically a partnership.2  Also, there is the fact
that the English law has never recognized joint adventure as an
independent relationship but has frequently referred to it as a
particularized partnership, sometimes as a "special" partnership.
The view of the English cases seems to be that the so-called joint
adventure of our law is simply a partnership, the object of which
is the ultimate accomplishment of some specific business transac-
tion rather than the accomplishment of many business transactions
as in the case'of normal partnerships. 3
This contradictory situation has prompted the following investi-
gation for the purpose of determining whether or not there is a law
of joint adventure, or if the law of partnership covers the entire
field. Incidentally, it is submitted that if it should be determined
that there is no law of joint adventure, but only a law of partner-
ship, then it is a contradiction to say that joint adventure is an
independent legal relationship, and a substantial simplification may
*Professor of Law, University of Washington, Seattle, Wash.
iSee: Third Decennial Digest, "Joint Adventure;" Rowley, Modern
Law of Partnership, sec. 975; Meinhard v. Salmon, (1928) 249 N. Y.
458, 164 N. E. 545.
2Rowley, Modern Law of Partnership, sec. 975.
3Lindley, Partnership, 9th ed,, p. 271 et seq.
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be effected by eliminating any separate classification for it and by
treating it as a partnership.
4
It is generally conceded that the law applicable to joint ad-
ventures is, for the most part, identical with that of partnership
and that substantially the same consequences ensue from its ap-
plication to particular situations. But there are a few situations in
which it has been thought that the joint adventure is governed by
rules of law not applicable to partnerships similarly situated, and
it has been asserted from time to time that these differences fur-
nish a ground for distinguishing them as independent legal rela-
tionships.5
I
(1) It has been asserted as a general rule that joint ad-
venturers may sue each other at law while partners must sue in
equity." This has repeatedly been pointed out as distinguishing
partnership and joint adventure-in fact, some courts have gone
so far as to say that it constitutes the chief distinction between
them.7 If it is conceded that joint adventurers do have an un-
41t is hoped that some further elucidation of the theory and purpose
of the ensuing discussion is pardonable. The writer does not wish to be
misunderstood. The purpose is really a double one. First, it is to
examine what has been done in the name of joint adventure-what
rules of law applied and what results reached by their application; sec-
ond, to discover if different rules would have been applied and different
results reached had the association been thought of as a partnership.
The theory is that things equal to the same thing are equal to each
other. Thus, if a problem of liability arises involving an association
which is admittedly either a partnership or a joint adventure, and the
same liability will be imposed by the application of the same rules irre-
spective of which name is given to it, then partnership and joint adven-
ture are one and the same so far as that kind of liability is concerned.
Similarly with problems of right, power, privilege, etc. Then if in all
legal problems involving the legal position of the association this situa-
tion exists, it may appropriately be said that there is a distinction
without a difference, and that partnership and joint adventure are the
same thing.5 No particular effort has been made to give a detailed description of
the various situations to which the name of joint adventure has been
applied. Such an attempt would be very tedious and of little value for
the purposes of this article. It seems sufficient to say that the cases
show an application of it to every association that could be regarded as a
partnership except for the limitation of its scope or purpose to the
accomplishment of a single ultimate business transaction, irrespective of
the nature of the legal controversy to which it has become a party. Such
exceptions to this generalization as there are will be specially noted
hereafter.
OBrudvick v. Frosaker Blaisdell Co., (1927) 56 N. D. 215, 216 N. W.
891; Miller v. Walser, (1919) 42 Nev. 497, 181 Pac. 437; Bruce v.
Hastings, (1868) 41 Vt. 380; (1920) 33 Harv. L. Rev. 852.7 Miller v. Walser, (1919) 42 Nev. 497, 181 Pac. 437. The court said
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limited right to sue inter parties at law and that they are permitted
to sue at law under circumstances where partners cannot or should
not, then it may be admitted that a difference exists between part-
nership and joint adventure. But in view of the present state of
authorities, this can hardly be conceded.
The general rule in partnership is that one partner may sue
another at law, and one of the exceptions to this rule is that when
the claim arises out of a partnership transaction which has not
been liquidated, the action must be brought in equity.8 The rea-
sop for the exception is that without an accounting or other liquida-
tion of partnership affairs no intelligent judgment could be ren-
dered, and only courts of equity are prepared to conduct a liquida-
tion of this kind. On the other hand, it is a well-settled rule that
if the partners have had a private liquidation of their affairs so
that a court of law can see what judgment should be rendered, an
action at law upon a partnership transaction will be entertained.
since it does not fall within the reason of the exception.9 Thus
the test of the right of one partner to sue another at law upon a
partnership transaction is logically reduced to this factual deter-
mination-are the partnership affairs of the parties sufficiently
simplified so that the court can pronounce an intelligent judgment?
Now what is said to be a joint adventure is very frequently an
undertaking of a very limited scope in which the finances are
practically in a state of liquidation at all times, and, with few ex-
ceptions, it is only in situations of this kind that the courts have
actually permitted joint adventurers to sue each other at law upon
a transaction connected with or arising out of the prosecution of
the joint adventure.
In the last twenty years, during which the concept of joint ad-
venture has had its maximum growth, not a single case is to be
found in which a contrary result was reached. In fact the vast
that "the prinicpal distinction between a partnership and joint adventure
is that in most jurisdictions, where any is regarded as existing, one party
may sue the other at law for a breach of the contract; but this right will
not preclude a suit in equity for an accounting."
8Douthit v. Douthit, (1892) 133 Ind. 26, 32 N. E. 715; Beede v.
Fraser, (1894) 66 Vt. 114, 28 Atl. 880; Ryder v. Wilcox, (1869) 103
Mass. 24; Ivy v. Walker, (1880) 58 Miss. 253; Wycoff v. Purnell, (1860)
10 Iowa 332; Cook v. Canny, (1893) 96 Mich. 398, 55 N. W. 987.
OClarke v. Mills, (1887) 36 Kan. 393, 13 Pac. 569; Kutz v. Dreibelbis
(1889) 126 Pa. St. 335, 17 Atl. 609; Crockett v. Burleson, (1907) 60
W. Va. 252, 54 S. E. 431; Remington v. Allen, (1871) 109 Mass. 47;
Crittenden v. Cobb, (C.C.Pa. 1907) 156 Fed. 535; Reiser v. Johnson,
(1917) 65 Okla. 307, 166 Pac. 723; Ledford v. Emerson, (1905) 140
N. C. 288, 52 S. E. 641.
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majority of actions between joint adventurers in this period have
been in equity for reasons that will shortly appear. Of eighty-five
such actions examined, only five were at law, and while the ac-
tion was sustained in each, yet the finances of the undertaking in
each case were so far liquidated that no accounting was necessary
to determine the rights of the parties. Rationally, it seems that
actions at law between partners should be permitted under similar
circumstances; at least it may be said that the unlimited right of
joint adventurers to sue each other at law is recognized, if at all,
only by way of dictum. That this is the true state of affairs will
be apparent upon consideration of the five law cases mentioned
above.
Perhaps the most significant of these is Joring v. Harriss0
where the parties owned certain cotton and agreed to sell it joint-
ly and divide the profits. An action by one adventurer against the
other for his share of the profits was entertained by a court of law.
but it was emphasized that "the subject-matter of the adventure
was very simple" and that the rights of the parties could adequately
be determined. Jidian Petroleum Corp. v. Courtney Petroleum
Co.,"' is a later federal case and in addition to being rested upon
the authority of Joring v. Harriss, is a poorly reasoned opinion-
insofar as the right of joint adventurers to sue inter parties at law
is concerned, consisting of but a single brief sentence, laying down
the rule without discussion. In Annon v. Brown s there had been
a private liquidation prior to the bringing of the action, which
was one in equity for dissolution of partnership, and the court held
that an adequate remedy at law was available under the circumn-
stances, and treated the association as a joint adventure rather
than a partnership. Again, in Champion v. D'Yarmett,"3 the facts
show that the parties had reduced an undertaking for the drilling
of oil wells to a state of practical liquidation which made it possible
for a court of law to adjudge intelligently. The action was one to
recover one half the moneys expended by plaintiff for the under-
taking, and it appeared that he, alone, had made such expenditures
and was, therefore, entitled to a judgment for one-half the total
sum expended. Peterson v. Nichol- 4A purports to hold that joint
adventurers may sue inter parties at law upon the undertaking, but
10(C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1923) 292 Fed. 974.
"I(C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1927) 22 F. (2d) 360.
12(1909) 65 W. Va. 34, 63 S. E. 691.
13(Tex. Civ. App. 1927) 293 S. W. 587.
14(1916) 90 Wash. 398, 156 Pac. 406.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
as a matter of fact the decision is rested upon the ground that a
clear right to contribution for expenses appearing, an action at law
may be maintained to recover it.
It is believed that the foregoing facts are sufficiently persuasive
to refute the notion that joint adventurers have been given an un-
limited right to sue each other at law upon joint adventure trans-
actions, or, that they are permitted to sue at law where partners
should not. However, in order to dispose completely of a common
misconception, attention is called to the several recent cases in
which it has been held that joint adventurers will not be permitted
to sue each other at law upon adventure transactions, unless a
liquidation has been had, or the transaction is one requiring no
liquidation, and indicating that otherwise the proper remedy is in
equity as in the case of partners. The leading cases come from
New York. Josias v. Sugar Products Co.Y1seems to be the first.
The parties had entered upon a joint adventure in the disposal and
sale of molasses which was carried on over a period of three years
and involved extensive commercial transactions. At the termina-
tion of the adventure plaintiff sued for his share of the profits and
the court held that it might be recovered in equity by an action for
an accounting, but not in an action at law upon the contract. They
said:
"From the allegations of the complaint it is clear that it is in-
tended to plead a cause of action at law to recover money due under
an express contract. The complaint fails to allege such a cause of
action. It is well settled that a partner cannot sue his copartner
for his share of the profits under the partnership agreement, un-
less there has been a settlement, a balance struck, and an express
promise to pay.1 6 Joint adventures and partnerships are governed
by the same rule.' 7
"It appears, however, from the allegations of the complaint,
that a joint adventure existed; that business thereunder was con-
ducted for a period; that the joint adventfire had terminated; that
the parties have not agreed upon the amount of profits. These
facts entitle plaintiff to an accounting, and the complaint can be
sustained on that ground, notwithstanding plaintiff has failed to
demand such relief in his complaint.' 8 Defendant's motion for
judgment on the pleadings must therefore be denied."
' (Sup. Ct. 1918) 169:N. Y. S. 887.
'
6Citing Arnold v. Arnold, (1882) 90 N. Y. 580, 583; Lobsitz v. Lise-
berger, (1915) 168 App. Div. 840, 154 N. Y. S. 556.
'
7 Citing Ross v. Willett, (1894) 76 Hun 211, 27 N. Y. S. 785.
'sCiting Schulsinger v. Blau, (1903) 84 App. Div. 390, 82 N. Y. S.
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Consolidated Machinery and Wrecking Co. v. Harper Machin-
ery Co.' 9 and MZ urphy v. Community Motion Picture BureauW- lay
down the same rule. In the latter case an action at law by one
joint adventurer against another for a share of the profits was
dismissed with the following comment:
"As I read the agreement, it plainly comes within the definition
accorded to it by the parties themselves of a 'joint enterprise,' and
since there is no claim that the actual accounts of the parties have
been settled or adjusted so as to establish a fixed balance due from
one to the other, any action between them in reference to their re-
spective interests therein must be determined in an appropriate ac-
tion for an accounting in a court of equity."2' 1
Apparently this principle has gained some currency in other jur-
isdictions as well. In Keyes v. Nins"2' a California court, in up-
holding the right of joint adventurers to seek relief in equity by
way of accounting and settlement, said:
"But there is a considerable amount of law upon this subject,
the discussion of which here may well be regarded as academic,
since it is a matter of absolutely no consequence, so far as the deci-
sion of this case is concerned, whether the relation created between
the parties to this action is that of a partnership or a joint adven-
ture, or a limited partnership, which we are inclined to believe it to
be; for it is held by the cases that the resemblance between a part-
nership and a joint adventure is so close that the rights as between
adventurers are governed practically by the same rules that govern
partnership. -3 Accordingly, a joint adventurer, as a partner in a
partnership may do, may sue in equity for an" accounting of the
profits flowing from the joint adventure. It is true that one party
in a joint adventure may sue the other at law for a breach of the
contract or a share of the profits or losses or a contribution for ad-
vances made in excess of his share, as where the adventure has been
closed and a party thereto is entitled to a sum certain as his share
of the adventure; but the right thus to sue at law does not pre-
clude a suit in equity for an accounting."
In Barton v. Coulson,-04 an Illinois case, the court held that an
action at law could be maintained by one adventurer against the
other for a share of the profits, as provided by contract, it appear-
ing that the adventure was terminated and the affairs liquidated.
19(1920) 190 App. Div. 283, 180 N. Y. S. 135.
20(1921) 190 N. Y. S. 849.
-0Citing Consolidated Machinery & Wrecking Co., (1920) 190 App.
Div. 283, 180 N. Y. S. 135, Josias v. Sugar Products Co., (Sup. Ct.
1918) 169 N. Y. S. 887.
22(1919) 43 Cal. App. 1, 184 Pac. 695.
"3Citing 15 R. C. L. 500.
24(1916) 196 Ill. App. 212.
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The following statement was quoted with approval from an
earlier case:
"In Gottschalk v. Smith, 5 it was held: 'An action for money
had and received may be maintained for a share of the profits of
a single joint enterprise, under an agreement that such profits
should be equally divided, where the transaction is completed and
the profits received by the defendant.' In Southworth v. People,20
the court said: 'Where two parties engage in a single adventure in
which they are jointly interested, the transaction does not con-
stitute the parties partners so as to oust a court of law of juris-
diction.' 27 Here, the cattle had been sold, a loss had been sustained
and the amount thereof had been ascertained .between the parties,
and appellant had agreed to pay one-half the loss, if the jury were
warranted in believing the evidence introduced by appellee. Under
such circumstances we hold that an action at law could be main-
ta in e d .
'2 -8
Common sense commends the view taken by these cases. If
the adventure is an involved one and there has been no liquidation
of accounts, it is difficult to understand why an action should be
permitted at law any more than in the case of partnerships, and
why the only remedy is not in equity, where the dispute may ade-
quately be adjusted. Indeed, this seems to be the result the cases
actually reach.
Finally, and of greater importance, is the fact that even if joint
adventurers may sue at law when partners cannot, the difference
provides no reason for distinguishing them, or explanation of the
distinction. At most such a difference could only be regarded as a
consequence of the distinction rather than as a reason for it. If,
as is sometimes asserted, adventurers can sue at law when partners
cannot, this is because they are not partners-but that is quite dif-
25(1895) 156 II. 377, 40 N. E. 937.
26(1900) 183 Ill. 621, 56 N. E. 407.
27Citing: A similar principle is referred to in Fish v. Lapley, (1906)
128 Ill. App. 611; Aldrich v. Mathias, (1912) 167 Ill. App. 589; and
Clark v. Sidway, (1892) 142 U. S. 682, 12 Sup. Ct. 327, 35 L. Ed. 1157.
Authorities in other states holding otherwise are found in a note in
5 L. R. A. (N.S.) 510.
2 8To the same effect see: Crownshield Trading Corp. v. Earle,
(1922) 200 App. Div. 10, 192 N. Y. S. 304; Worms v. Lake, (1923) 120
Misc. Rep. 247, 198 N. Y. S. 861; Procter & Gamble Co. v. Pamelson,
(C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1923) 288 Fed. 299; In re Taub, (C.C.A. 2nd Cir.
1924) 4 F. (2d) 993.
Much of the confusion over the right of joint adventurers to sue
each other at law has resulted from the looseness of expression to be
found in the cases. There are some dicta to the effect that joint adven-
turers have an unlimited right to sue each other at law, but there seem
to be no decisions supporting that view.
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ferent from the proposition that because they can sue they are
not partners.
(2) That corporations may hold membership in joint adven-
tures and not in partnerships has been suggested as a ground for
distinguishing them as legal relationships. Aside from the obvious
objection that the difference is but a consequenwe of making a dis-
tinction and not a reason for making it, there are some serious
analytical obstacles in the way of accepting the suggestion.
The reason for the rule that it is ultra vires for a corporation to
enter into a partnership when not expressly authorized by its
charter is concisely stated in the well-known case of Mallory v.
Hanaur Oil-Works :20
"A partnershipl and a corporation are incongruous. Such a
contract is wholly inconsistent with the scope and tenor of the
powers expressly conferred, and the duties expressly enjoined upon
a corporation, whether it be a strictly business and private corpo-
ration, or one owing duties to the public, such as a common carrier.
In a partnership each member binds the firm when acting within
the scope of the business. A corporation must act through its di-
rectors or authorized agents, and no individual member can, a5
such member, bind the corporation. Now if a corporation be a
member of a partnership, it may be bound by any other member o
the association, and in so doing he would act, not as an officer
or agent of the corporation, and by virtue of authority received
from it, but as a principal in an association in which all are equal,
and each capable of binding the society by his acts. The whole
policy of the law creating and regulating corporations looks to the
exclusive management of the affairs of each corporation by the
officers provided for or authorized by its charter. This manage-
ment must be separate and exclusive, and any arrangement by
which the control of the affairs of the corporation should be taken
from its stockholders and the authorized officers and agents of the
corporation would be hostile to the policy of our general incorpora-
tion acts. The decided weight of authority is that a corporation
has not the power to enter a partnership, either with other cor-
porations, or with individuals. Says Mr. Morawetz: 'It seems
clear that corporations are not impliedly authorized to enter into
partnership with other corporations or individuals. The existence
of a partnership not only would interfere with the management of
the corporation by its regularly appointed officers, but would im-
pair the authority of the shareholders themselves, and involve the
company in new responsibility, through agents over whom it had
no control.' "30
29(1888) 86 Tenn. 598.
30Citing: 1 Morawitz, Private Corporations 421; Whittenton Mills
v. Upton, (1858) 10 Gray (Mass.) 582, 71 Am. Dec. 681.
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Consistently with this theory it has been held that it is not ultra
vires for a corporation to enter upon a partnership where the entire
management and control of the business is vested in the corpora-
tion, although as a matter of partnership law, it is not easy to
understand just how such an arrangement inter sese will protect
the corporation from responsibility to innocent third persons for
acts of the other partner performed within the apparent scope of
the business. 31 And it has also been held that the courts will not
hesitate to impose partnership liability upon corporations to prevent
an injustice, irrespective of the ultra vires nature of the corporate
conduct in becoming involved in the partnership arrangement. 2
Assuming (as cases to be discussed infra will show to be true)
that the same element of mutual agency is present in a joint ad-
venture that exists in partnership, and with reference to the fore-
going reasoning, to what extent is a corporation better protected
from external control as a joint adventurer than as a partner?
In taking up the cases dealing with the power of a corporation
to engage in a joint adventure one is immediately impressed by the
scarcity of actual authority upon the problem. The writer has ex-
amined fourteen cases purporting to confirm that power and has
reached the conclusion that there is practically no authority for
saying that a corporation can engage in a joint adventure where it
could not have also engaged in a partnership. Eight of these cases
must be regarded as highly unsatisfactory since in all of them the
corporation was given full control of the venture and the decisions
rested upon the theory of avoiding an injustice.33
31Markowitz v. Greenwall Theatrical Circuit Co., (Tex. Civ. App.
1903) 75 S. W. 74. See Allen v. Woonsocket Co., (1876) 11 R. I. 288.32Mervyn Inv. Co. v. Biber, (1921) 184 Cal. 637, 194 Pac. 1037;
Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Strauss, (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) 243
S. W. 528; Kaufman v. Catzen, (1925) 100 W. Va. 79, 130 S. E. 292.
33All of these are cases 'in which the problem waq one of liability
and the question of corporate authority to engage in the prosecution
of a joint adventure was dealt with only incidentally. For this reason
it seems permissible to doubt the generality of their dictum that it is
intra vires for corporations to engage in joint adventures.
A summary of a few of them will illustrate the point.
Houston v. Dexter & Carpenter, Inc., (D. C. Va. 1924) 300 Fed.
354. Bill in equity to enforce claimed fiduciary obligations against a
corporation as a member of a joint adventure. Defense of ultra vires.
Held, the corporation could not escape its fiduciary obligations on
that ground. The court said that the parties were joint adventurers
and emphasized the fact that defendant corporation was not -subject
to any control by plaintiffs in the prosecution of the adventure.
Bates v. Coronado Beach Co., (1895) 109 Cal. 160, 41 Pac. 855.
Bill in equity for an accounting on a partnership agreement between
plaintiff and defendaht corporation. Defense of tiltra vires. Held,
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It is submitted that insofar as any of the cases may hold that
a corporation has the power and authority to engage in a joint ad-
venture where it would not be permitted to engage in a partner-
ship, the true reason for such a holding is a desire to escape in
some way the stringency of the rule making it ultra vires for cor-
porations to engage in partnerships. However, it seems improb-
able that many courts are prepared to hold that the power and
authority of a corporation to participate in joint adventure is sub-
stantially different than in the case of partnerships.
34
the contract was one of joint adventure and since the entire management
and control of the adventure was left to the corporation, it could not
be regarded as ultra vires.
"It was not ultra vires for the appellant to enter into the agreement
with the plaintiff. The power of a corporation to enter into a general
partnership with an individual or with another corporation is not here
involved. The ground upon which this power is sometimes denied
is that a partnership implies the power of each partner, under his
authority as a general agent for all the purposes of the partnership,
to bind the others by his individual acts, whereas the statutes under
which a corporation exists require its powers to be exercised by a board
of directors, and precludes it from becoming bound by the act of the
one who may be only its partner. There is, however, in the present
case, no question of agency in the management of the affairs of the
corporation. The plaintiff paid the money to the appellant, and trans-
ferred to its appointee the title to the land, so that the entire manage-
ment of the business contemplated by the contract was intrusted to the
corporation itself. There is no rule of law that will preclude a cor-
poration from entering into a contract with an individual which will
have the effect to carry out directly or indirectly the object of its in-
corporation, and to provide in that agreement that the gains or losses
of the venture shall be borne equally by both parties."
Louis Werner Sawmill Co. v. Vinson & Bolton, (1929) 220 Ala.
210, 124 So. 420. Action upon a contract of employment between
plaintiffs and a partnership of which defendant corporation was alleged
to be member. The cause was discontinued as to the other alleged
partners and prosecuted against defendant corporation alone. De-
fense of ultra vires. HFIeld, that the defendant was liable on the contract
of employment, it being executed and defendant having received the
benefits of the performance. The court quoted Corpus Juris 14 a, 293
in support of its conclusion.
Kaufman v. Catzen, (1925) 100 W. Va. 79, 130 S. E. 292. Bill in
equity for dissolution of a joint adventure. One of the grounds urged
was the assignment of the joint adventure res to a corporation by
defendant, one of the original adventurers. Held, this was no ground
for dissolution and that the joint adventure continued with the corpor-
ation as a member, since complete control of the adventure was
rested in it.
See also, Municipal Paving Co. v. Herring, (1915) 50 Okla. 470,
150 Pac. 1067; Hackett v. Multnomah Ry. Co., (1885) 12 Or. 124, 6
Pac. 659.
3 4Upon strict analysis the reasoning upon which it is held to be
ultra vires for corporations to become associated in partnerships seems
to break down. But the courts, out of respect to precedent, will
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(3) In Keyes v. Nins3 5 the court held that there was no ele-
ment of mutual agency in a joint adventure, and that unlike part-
ners, one adventurer had no authority to bind the joint adventurer.
Discussing possible distinctions between partnership and joint ad-
venture, the court said:
"There are other features which differentiate the two relations.
among which may be mentioned the element of principal and agent
which inheres in the partnership relation, each partner embracing
the character both of a principal and agent, being the former when
he acts for himself in the partnership.36 In a joint adventure, no
one of the parties thereto can bind the joint adventurer."
But this view has not been accepted in most jurisdictions, and
it is generally held that there is the same element of mutual agency
in joint adventures as in partnerships. Upon principle this is the
more desirable rule, for if persons combine their resources in a
common undertaking, the resulting association will almost invaria-
bly be one warranting the implication of a mutual agency. And
in any event the distinction proposed in Keyes v. Nims seems un-
satisfactory, since it assumes that mutual agency is a test of part-
nership, whereas that is a very debatable matter upon which there
is much conflict of authority."
(4) Under section 5 of the Bankruptcy Law as presently con-
stituted, a partnership may be adjudicated bankrupt, and some
special provisions are made for the settlement of the partnership
affairs. It has been suggested that this provision of the statute
does not include joint adventures and that in consequence there
must be some distinction between partnership and joint adventure.
There are three possible answers to this contention-(a) if true,
it is not cause but effect, (b) joint adventures may be thrown into
,continue to do lip service to the rule. The doctrine of joint adventure
as a different kind of association opens up an avenue of escape which
the courts have hesitatingly entered upon, That it has been useful to
draw a distinction between partnerships and joint adventures in this
connection, must be conceded-that it is any longer necessary to con-
tinue it, is questioned. See Rowley, The Corporate Partner, (1930)
14 MINNESOTA LAW REviEw 769.
35(1919) 43 Cal. App. 1, 184 Pac. 695.36Citing, Story, Partnership 1; Jackson v. Hooper, (1909) 76 N. J.
Eq. 185, 74 AtI. 130, 135.371n re Taub, (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1924) 4 F. (2d) 993; 0. K. Boiler
& Welding Co. v. Minnetonka Lumber Co., (1924) 103 Okla. 226, 229
Pac. 1045, 48 A. L. R. 1055, 1061.
However, mutual agency is an attribute of partnership, whether
it be regarded as cause or effect. To say that it does not exist 'as an
attribute of joint adventure is. to draw a distinction that ordinarily
will be unwarranted. Mutual agency is a legal conclusion and not- a
state of- facts. .
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bankruptcy under this provision of the statute, (c) in any event,
joint adventures may be thrown into bankruptcy under the pro-
visions of section 4(b) of the statute.
(a) This is the now familiar argument that the difference, if
any, is only a consequence of making a distinction and does not
furnish a reason for or explanation of it.
(b) In Black on Bankruptcy the following statements appear:
"The Bankruptcy Act, insofar as it applies to partners, includes
not only the familiar case of a partnership for the general prose-
cution of a particular business, but also the rare case of a 'univer-
sal' partnership, involving all the property and all the business of
all the partners. And it also includes what is sometimes termed a
'special' partnership, formed for the single purpose of prosecuting
some special adventure or enterprise." 38
In support of this conclusion the author cites a single case,
Thrall v. Crampton, which directly held that the bankruptcy law as
then in force would permit the adjudication of joint adventures
under the provision dealing with partnerships.
However, the case is unquestionably open to the objection that
it was decided at a time when the partnership provisions of the
bankruptcy law were construed differently from what they are to-
day, and when the line had not been so sharply drawn between joint
adventures and partnerships. Curiously, it represents the only
direct authority upon the question that the writer has been able
to find. Nor has diligent inquiry among bankruptcy practitioners
produced any satisfactory information with reference to the ac-
cepted practices of the bankruptcy courts. Apparently it must be
conceded that the question is an open one.
(c) It seems clear that a joint adventure may be thrown irito
bankruptcy under the provisions of section 4(b) of the Bankruptcy
Law, if not under the provisions of section 5. "Any unincorpo-
rated company" has been applied as if it read "any unincorporated
association," under which it would be permissible to include joint
adventures. 40
In this connection it is urged that while partnership creditors
have, by virtue of section 5(f) of the Bankruptcy Law, a priority
over individual creditors in the assets of the firm, no such priority
should be accorded to creditors of a joint adventure. Here it must
be pointed out that while there is no question concerning the pri-
,1 3SBlack, Bankruptcy, 2nd ed., p. 82.
39(D.C. Vt. 1877) 9 Ben. 218, 23 Fed. Cas. No. 14;008.
'loSee also: Bankruptcy act, sec. 1 (6), and In re Tidewater Coal
Exchange, (D.C.N.Y. 1921) 274 Fed. 1008. ..
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ority of partnership creditors, there is no satisfactory authority for
the proposition that creditors of a joint adventure do not have the
same right. Obviously they do have that right if joint adventures
may be treated as partnerships for purpose of bankruptcy.
Furthermore, upon principle it may be said that they should
ordinarily have such a priority. The conventional theory upon
which. partnership creditors are sometimes given a priority in part-
nership or firm assets is that since the peculiar "tenancy in part-
nership" by which partnership property is held for partnership
purposes includes some sort of a lien in favor of each partner
against all the others to secure the application of partnership
assets to partnership debts, partnership creditors must be given
priority over individual creditors so far as partnership assets are
concerned, for individual creditors can reach no more than the in-
dividual partner's share in the surplus after all the partnership
debts are paid. Thus the priority is explained by the incidents of
the tenancy by which partnership property is held.
There has been much criticism of this theory, and it admittedly
has its short-comings, but it nevertheless must be regarded as the
most popular one and many cases have followed it.41 Should not
the same theory apply to joint adventures-at least to all in which
the adventure property is regarded as being held by a tenancy like
that in partnership? It has been recognized that joint adventurers
hold the property of the adventure by a tenancy quite like the
tenancy in partnership. In Cain's Adm'r v. Hubble42 the court
held that a mortgagee of the interest of a member of a joint adven-
ture stood upon the same footing as a mortgagee of the interest
of a partner and had a lien only upon the mortgagor's share of the
surplus after the debts of the adventure were paid. The court
reasoned that since the rules of partnership applied to joint ad-
ventures, the ownership of the adventure property must be regard-
ed as identical with the ownership of the partnership property and
that the rights of creditors should be worked out as in the case of
partnerships. It logically follows that adventure creditors will
41Broadway Nat'l Bank v. Wood, (1896) 165 Mass. 312, 43 N. E.
100; Kelly v. Scott, (1872) 49 N. Y. 595; Harris v. Peabody, (1881) 73
Me. 262.
Regarding the partnership as a legal entity, distinct from the asso-
ciates who compose it, a few cases have worked out the priority on ihe
theory of avoiding a fraud on the firm. For a discussion of these cases,
see (1925) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 247.
42(1919) 184 Ky. 38, 211 S. W. 413.
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have the same priority in adventure assets that partnership credi-
tors have in partnership assets, if there is no substantial difference
in the ownership of the property in the two associations.4
3
II
To the present writer, the most satisfactory explanation that
has been advanced to account for the distinction that is drawn be-
tween partnership and joint adventure is expressed in an anony-
mous note in the Harvard Law Review. The author of the note
says:
"A joint adventure has been defined as an association of two
or more persons to carry out a single business enterprise for profit.
The Uniform Partnership Act defined a partnership as an associa-
tion of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business
for profit. Two possible distinctions are apparent: (1) that while
a partnership is formed for the transaction of a general business
of a particular kind, a joint adventure relates to a single transac-
tion, (2) that in a partnership each member is co-owner of a
business-a fact that does not exist in a joint adventure. The
former has sometimes been expressed by the courts as the main
difference. But there are numerous decisions to the effect that
there can be a partnership for a single transaction. Even though
this distinction did exist it is difficult to see how it could be a use-
ful guide to the courts.
"The real difference appears in the second suggestion. A
partnership involves the conception of a business-an entity, in a
mercantile sense at least, separate and distinct from the individual
affairs of the members. Such an entity cannot be created by the
doing of a single act. It is the performance of a series of acts, all
done for the same ultimate purpose of profit under the joint agree-
ment so as to be bound together into a unit, that underlies the con-
ception in the minds of mercantile men of an entity quite distinct
from their individual affairs; and this entity the law recognizes
to a certain extent and to it attaches certain incidents. But if
the joint agreement is such that it does not contemplate the creation
of such an entity, there is no need of turning to the complex law
of partnership for a guide, but each problem arising thereunder can
be solved by the ordinary law of contracts.."44
The controlling thought in this analysis is that the concept of
partnership has gradually been refined and developed to a point
where it is concerned only with an association engaged in business
'
3 There are many additional cases in the field of joint adventure,
dealing with such questions as the duties of joint adventurers inter se,
the element of delectus personarum, etc. To discuss them will serve
no useful purpose. They embody an ordinary application of the rules
of partnership to joint adventures.
44(1920) 33 Harv. L. Rev. 852.
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involving continuity-a continuing enterprise-whereas joint ad-
venture is an association which does not have for its purpose the
carrying on of a business in the sense of a continuing enterprise,
Much strength is added to this explanation of the distinction
by the conclusion of the author of the note that the courts have
found the law of partnership too complex and cumbersome for so
simplified an association as the joint adventure.
There seems to be little room for doubting the accuracy of this
explanation. The language of the joint adventure cases affords
ample proof for the view that in recent years courts have been
greatly influenced in drawing the distinction by a concept of part-
nership as an association of greater formality, permanency, and
continuity than joint adventures. Unquestionably, partnership
situations frequently-perhaps usually-possess these attributes in
a much greater degree than joint adventure, and the judicial mind,
seeking to classify on the basis of factual differences has denom-
inated them as associations involving a distinct legal relationship.
Simply stated, the increasing tendency of courts to treat partner-
ships for many purposes as entities apart from the partners, the
tendency to emphasize the "firm" or the "business"-to lean to-
ward the commercial view of partnership-has fostered the de-
velopment of joint adventures as very similar associations for
profit,.but to which this concept was thought not to be adaptable.
4
However, this explanation of the joint adventure concept-not
only falls short of justifying the concept but also fails to explain
satisfactorily many of the joint adventure cases. Assuming that
it represents the most convincing argument that can be made for
the doctrine of joint adventure, there are three particulars in
which it seems inadequate.
{a) It is asserted that the courts regard the law of partner-
ship as too complex for joint adventures. But when it is recalled
that practically all courts have applied substantially the same rules
of law to them that they have applied to partnerships, that theory
is exploded. The courts have not found the partnership code too
complex-they have adopted it at-practically every point for the
determination of joint adventure problems. 6
*'For cases illustrative of this tendency, see Dolan v. Dolan,
(1928) 107 Conn. 342, 140 AtL. 745; Dobbins v. Texas Co., (1929) 136
Okla. 40, 275 Pac. 643'; Bond v. O'Donnell, (1928) 205 Iowa 902, 218
N. V. 898; Finney v,* Terrell, (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) 276 S. -W. 340.
4' That the law of partnership is the law of joint -adventures is not
mere dictum. The courts have not only said that the same rules apply,
but they haie applied them.
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(b) It does not explain the substantial number of cases in
which the joint adventure consisted in the co-ownership of a busi-
ness. True, the numerical majority of joint adventure cases do
not involve the carrying on of a business in the sense of a continu-
ing enterprise, but there are enough of them that do to make any
generalization to the contrary unsatisfactory." And aside from
the element of contemplated continuity with which partners are
frequently imbued, it is too plain for argument that joint adven-
tures often require a much more extensive course of commercial
dealings than some partnerships.4" Then too, it is to be remem-
bered that partnerships may be formed for the doing of a single
and limited transaction in which the element of continuity and
permanency are not to be found.49 The difference between such
partnerships and joint adventures is not easy to find. They are
organized through the medium of contract- for identical purposes;
the form of organization and the methods of doing business are
identical; the business transacted may be identical; the legal con-
sequences of the organization and the business transacted may be
identical; both the contemplated and actual periods of time over
which the transactions are pursued may be identical; indeed, it
471n the following cases the adventurers were engaged in carrying
on a business, owned in common, the profits of which were divided in
common: Clinchfield Fuel Co. v. Henderson Iron Works, (C.C.A. Sth
Cir. 1918) 254 Fed. 411; Alderton v. Williams, (1905) 139 Mich. 296,
102 N. W. 753; O'Hara v. Harman, (1897) 14 App. Div. 167, 43 N. Y.
S. 556; Voegtlin v. Bowdoin, (1907) 54 Misc. Rep. 254, 104 N. Y. S.
394; Selwyn & Co. v. Waller, (1914) 212 N. Y. 507, 106 N. E. 321;
Jackson v. Hooper, (1909) 76 N. J. Eq. 185, 74 Atl. 130; Hayton v.
Appleton Mach. Co., (1923) 179 Wis. 597, 192 N. W. 168.48Much language is expended in the cases in emphasizing a dis-
tinction between "business" and "adventure" or "enterprise," but there
seems to be no very certain test for determining whether a given course
of conduct comprises the one or the other.
49"To constitute a partnership, it is not necessary that there shoIld
be a series of transactions between the partners, nor that the relation
should be continued for a long period of time. It may exist for a
single transaction or undertaking." Jones v. Davies, (1899) 60 Kan.
309, 56 Pac. 484, 72 Am. St. Rep. 354.
"It is also the rule in this state that partnerships may be formed
for a single transaction, and one partner may sue another for matters
growing out of this kind of partnership." Schindler v. Sorbitz, (Mo.
App. 1925) 268 S. W. 432.
Accord: Shakelford v. Williams, (1913) 182 Ala. 95, 62 So. 57;
Milligan v. Mackinlay, (1923) 209 Ill. 618, 138 N. E. 147; Kopka v.
Yockey, (1921) 76 Ind. App. 218, 131 N. E. 828; Rush v. First Nat'l
Bank (Tex. Civ. App. 1913) 160 S. W. 319; Peck v. Powell, (Tex.
Civ. App. 1924) 259 S. W. 640; Pritchett v. Thomas Plater & Co. et al,(1921) 144 Tenn: 406, 232 S. W. 961.
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may safely. be said that frequently the entire factual situation will
'be identical.
(c) The explanation is predicated primarily upon the propo-
sition that a partnership is an entity separate and distinct from
the associates who compose it, whereas joint adventure is not to
be so regarded.
There are three apparent objections to this proposition.
It assumes that partnership is a separate legal entity, and that
must be regarded as an unwarranted assumption in view of the
hostile attitude of many courts and the Uniform Partnership Act
toward the recognition of such a theory.10 Partnerships may every-
where be treated as separate legal entities for a few purposes, as
a matter of convenience, but it is hardly fair to characterize them
as entities generally and for all purposes.
If all partnerships are to be regarded as entities, then the part-
nership for the carrying out of a single enterprise would seem to
refute the theory that partnership entity can result only from an
association in the prosecution of a continuing and permanent busi-
ness.
No reasons are suggested why a joint adventure may not be
treated as an entity for the sake of convenience, where the factual
situation is parallel with that of a partnership, which, as has been
pointed out, is sometimes the case.
III
Historically there appears to be no explanation of the joint ad-
venture concept. Partnership seems to have been recognized as a
legal relationship long before the modern theory of a joint adven-
ture made its appearance in the law, although joint adventure situ-
ations are usually much less complex and so much more likely to
exist -in the earlier stages of economic group development. How-
ever, if they did the courts saw nothing distinctive in them but
lumped them together with partnership, and this practice contin-
ues" to be the accepted rule in England. 1 Therefore, the concept
must be regarded as distinctly modern and local, appearing, as it
does, only in the decisions of the American courts.
It is practically impossible to estimate accurately when and how
5OAbbot v. Anderson, (1914) 265 Ill. 285, 106 N. E. 782; Adams
v. Church, (1902) 42 Or. 270, 70 Pac. 1037; Matter of Peck, (1912)
206 N. Y. 55, 99 N. E. 258; Loomis v. Wallblom, (1905) 94 Minn. 392,
102 N. W. 1114; Uniform Partnership Act, sec. 25.51Dolan v. Dolan, (1928) 107 Conn. 342, 140 Atl. 745; Lindley,
Partnership, 9th ed., p. 29 (and note 1).
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the theory of joint adventure had its origin. Progress in that di-
rection is impeded by two things-(1) failure of the earliest cases
in which the name is employed to explain how it was used, (2) fail-
ure of the later decisions to explain from what source the concept
was derived. The first cases in which the name was used were
Hourquwbie iv. Girard5 2 and Lyles v. Styles.5 3 From the appear-
ance of these cases down to the Civil War period there are a very
few scattering uses of it," but in all of these cases it seems proba-
ble that the courts were making use of it, not to describe the
relationship of the parties, but to describe the object or. purpose
of the relationship. In many of them, the reference is to "ad-
venture," "venture" or "enterprise" instead of to "joint
adventure." How much of this language was the result of con-
scious choice and how much the result of precedent or convenience
in expression will never be known. At any rate, it was not until
the decision in Ross v. Willett55 that the courts began to refer un-
equivocally to joint adventure as a legal relationship. But the de-
velopment since that case has been phenomenal.", This may be at-
tributed in part to the fact that the courts had many ready-made
rules for it, and in part to the large number of undertakings of the
52(C.C.Pa. 1808) 2 Wash. C. C. 212, 12 Fed. Cas. No. 6,732.53(C.C.Pa. 1808) 2 Wash. C. C. 224, 15 Fed. Cas. No. 8,625.54See: Kane v. Smith, (1815) 12 Johns (N.Y.) 156; Claflin v.
Godfrey, (1838) 21. Pick. (Mass.) 1; Buckmaster v. Grundy, (1846)
8 Ill. 626; Taylor v. Bradley, (1868) 39 N. Y. 129, 1 Abb. Dec. (N.Y.)'
363, 100 Am. Dec. 132.
55(1894) 76 Hun (N.Y.) 211, 27 N. Y. S. 785. Even in this case
the court did not attempt to draw a clear cut distinction between
partnership and joint adventure. They said:
"It is insisted in behalf of the appellants that no partnership ex-
isted as between James G. Ross and themselves, but, if there were, that
his administrator did not succeed to the legal title to the property
and had no right to sell it. A joint adventure is a limited partnership;
not limited in a statutory sense as a liability, but as to its scope and
duration; and under our law joint adventures and partnerships are
governed by the same rules. Hubbell v. Buhler, (1887) 43 Hun (N.Y.)
82-84."
The following statement appeared in Hubbell v. Buhler. "It is
immaterial whether the combination formed by the parties is a 'joint
adventure', or. a 'limited copartnership' (not limited in the statutory
sense as to liability, but as to scope and duration), as, under our law
both are governed by the same rules."561n this development joint adventures have not been confined to
any particular field of associated business activity. They have been
recognized as existing for a great variety of undertakings, including the
purchase and ownership of property for speculation (land, corporate
stock, and other personal property), the staging of theatrical pro-
ductions, working of mining properties, rendition of services, publish-
mg of books, etc.
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kind to which the concept was thought to apply. Governed entire-
ly by established laws of partnership, there was nothing new in
joint adventure to retard its growth, and many of the difficulties
ordinarily encountered in the selection of principles had already
been disposed of in the partnership cases.
There is a suggestion of econ6mic significance in the fact that
joint adventure grew up during a period of extreme transition and
uncertainty in the law of business association. However, the ob-
stacles to further correlation are so great, due to the generality
with which this newcomer in the field of associations was de-
veloped, that its recorded history can hardly be regarded as a
useful source from which to glean an explanation of its origin.
On the whole the concept of joint adventure as a relationship
or association different from partnership, seems to have little, if
any, reality. To a lawyer or to a litigant it can make no difference
in the present state of the law, whether the court calls the associa-
tion by one name or the other. For all practical purposes no one
cares very much whether the law treats joint adventures as a special
type of partnership or a different kind of association. The conse-
quences of being held to be one or the other are almost, if not quite,
identical.
A recent California case5" lays down a common test for partner-
ship and joint adventure. The court was asked to construe a con-
tract as creating either a partnership or a joint'adventure between
the contracting parties. They refused this request, saying:
"Our conclusion is that the contract relationship of the defen-
dants, each to the other, is neither that of partners nor of joint ad-
venturers. The intention of the parties to the contract as expressed
therein, is clearly against the contention of partnership or joint
adventure, in that said contract provides for a letting to the express
company of the right to control, conduct and transact transporta-
tion business over the lines of the railway company, and the rail-
way company agrees to furnish the necessary cars and car space
to the express company for the per centum of net proceeds as com-
pensation. A sharing of profits i§ not the only test; there must be
a community of interest in the business to constitute either a
partnership or a joint adventure. Under contract the business
is the business of the express company and not the business of
the railway company."
When the law has progressed to this point-viz., applying the
same test and reaching the same legal consequences for both part-
nership and joint adventure-the usefulness' of regarding joint
57Wallace v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., (Cal. 1930) 288 Pac. 834.
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adventure as a distinct kind of relation or association seems ques-
tionable.
IV
In two classes of cases the relationship of parties to a contract
has occasionally been referred to as a joint adventure to distinguish
it from that of partnership, and in these cases the distinction seems
to be one of some significance.
(1) It has ahvays been a rather difficult problem to determine
just where common ownership of property ends and partnership
begins. In the cases where the common owners (tenants in com-
mon, joint tenants, etc.) have agreed to make a particular use of
their property for the purpose of securing an advantage or making
a profit the difficulty of drawing the distinction is a great one. In
the majority of cases it has been held that if the agreement of the
common owners does not involve the use of their property as
the basis for carrying on a common business, the arrangement is
not a partnership although some of the incidents of partnership
do attach to it. 5 Where the courts take this view of the arrange-
ment the relationship of the parties is usually said to be one of
tenancy in common plus." However, in a few of these cases the
relationship has-been said to be one of joint adventure.
Cecil v. Montgomzery 0 is a case of this kind. Four persons
agreed to buy a tract of land, each to become owner of a one-
fourth interest, the tract to be leased for oil and gas, and each to
receive a proportionate share of the income. Plaintiff sued in
equity to establish a fiduciary relationship and recover his share of
the income derived from the lease of the land, alleging a joint ad-
venture. The trial court held that the evidence established a joini
adventure, that a fiduciary relationship existed between the adven-
turers, and gave relief to plaintiff. Upon appeal the defendant ob-
5$lt is quite easy for these associates more or less unconsciously
to slip into partnership by making slight changes in their arrange-
ment. When they have done this is -a hard question of fact that must
be dependent for its solution upon the particular facts in each case,
but until and unless they have done it they are not ordinarily held
to be partners.
See 47 Corpus Juris 702 and cases collected therein.59Bruce v. Hastings, (1868) 41 Vt. 380; Goell v. Morse, (1879) 126
Mass. 480; Morse v. Pacific Ry. Co., (1901) 191 Ill. 356, 61 N. E.
104; Conn. v. Crabb, (1888) 10 Ky. L. Rep. 155; Price v. Grice, (1904)
10 Idaho 443; 79 Pac. 387; Holton v. Guinn, (C.C.Mo. 1896) 76 Fed.
96; Rocky Mt. Stud. Farm Co. v. Lunt, (1915) 46 Utah 299, 151 Pac.
521.
00(1923) 95 Okla. 184, 218 Pac. 311.
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jected that the evidence did not establish a joint adventure, but the
court held that it did and affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
The situation was really one of tenancy in common plus; yet there
was no partnership. The liability of a partner to third persons
could hardly be imposed upon the associates, and the court held
that the joint aspect of partnership rights and obligations had no
application 'to the situation.
In Gehihar v. Konaske6 ' two brothers and a sister agreed to
contribute their time, services, etc., to the purchase and farming
of a section of land, each to get title to an undivided 1/3 of the
land. The land was to be paid for largely by crop payments, and
the sister was to contribute her services as housekeeper. The ar-
rangement was held to constitute a joint adventure. The court,
having so held, went on to say that the relationship between the
parties themselves was similar to that of partners because it was
fiduciary in character. While that is approximately so, it never-
theless seems doubtful that the court would have enforced all the
incidents of partnership in connection with this arrangement.
In McCreery v. Green62 it was agreed that A and B should
furnish money and C his services for the purpose of purchasing a
tract of government timber land, C to have an undivided 1/5 of
the land and A and B each an undivided 2/5. The land was ap-
parently to be sold as a unit, if sold at all. This was held to be a
joint adventure. No reference is made to partnership in the
opinion.
(2) In Wade v. Hornaday3 a contract was executed by A,
B and C by which they purported to create a partnership for the
sale of certain property then in the possession of C. Subsequently
C charged some advertising used in connection with the sale of the
property to the "partnership," and this action was brought to en-
force the claim against A and B as partners. The court held there
was no partnership and that since C had no other authority to bind
A and B in creating the obligation, they were not liable. The
court said:
"We think it is clear that under the contract in question no
partnership was created; that is, no commercial or trading part-
nership. The arrangement was formed, not for the purpose of
61(1923) 50 N. D. 256, 195 N. W. 558
62(1878) 38 Mich. 172.
See also: Winslow v. Young, (1900) 94 Me. 145, 47 Atl. 149; Green
v. Higham, (1901) 161 Mo. 333, 61 S. W. 798.
63(1914) 92 Kan. 293, 140 Pac. 870.
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buying and selling stock in general, nor did it contemplate the
general sale of the stock of the particular corporation mentioned
in the agreement. It was for the sole purpose of selling on com-
mission 250 shares of that stock in the city of Lawrence. Simi-
lar arrangements between parties for sharing both profits and
losses in a single venture, where the division was clearly intended
to be in lieu of compensation for services, or of office rent and ad-
vertising, and matters of that kind, have been held not to create
a partnership in the same sense that one partner could bind the
other by his contract ....
"The present case falls within the principle of many cases
which have arisen where parties undertake jointly a single enter-
prise or venture, as, for instance, that of buying a tract of land
and selling it again at an advance, the profit or losses to be shared
equally, the profits to be in lieu of services in the joint enterprise
undertaken, that of selling the particular land. Arrangements like
these have repeatedly been held not sufficient to constitute a part-
nership."
It is not entirely clear whether or not the court intended to say
that the relationship created by this arrangement was one of joint
adventure. Assuming that it did, the joint adventure consisted of
a rendition of services and a rental of property by A and B to C,
with compensation in the form of a share of the profits. There
are many cases in which similar arrangements have been distin-
guished from partnership, but the resultant relationship has not
usually been held to be one of joint adventure.64
CONCLUSION
A r~sum6 of what has been decided in the joint adventure cases
clearly reveals that the appellation "joint adventure" is very loose-
ly employed by many courts. It has been made to include not only
associations of two or more persons for the purpose of carrying
out a specific business transaction for profit, but also some associa-
641n nearly all of the reported cases of this kind the relationship has
been held to be one of debtor-creditor, principal and agent, employer
and employee, lessor-lessee, etc. See:
Beecher v. Bush, (1881) 45 Mich. 188, 7 N. W. 785; Salter v. Ham,
(1865) 31 N. Y. 321; Estabrook v. Woods, (1906) 192 Mass. 499, 78
N. E. 538; Sodiker v. Applegate, (1884) 24 W. Va. 411; Jeter v. Burg-
wyn, (1893) 113 N. C. 157, 18 S. E. 113; Boston Smelting Co. v. Smith,
(1880) 13 R. I. 27; Morgan v. Farrell, (1890) 58 Conn. 414, 20 Atl. 614.
In Nelson v. Lindsey, (1917) 179 Iowa 862, 162 N. W. 3, the court
held that where A gave money to B for use in the business of the
latter taking B's personal notes for the sum advanced and having a right
under the terms of the agreement to a share of the profits, the arrange-
ment was a joint adventure and not a partnership. This employment of
the term seems to be similar to that in Wade v. Hornaday. See also,
Donahue v. Haskamp, (1920) 109 Wash. 562, 187 Pac. 346. Compare,
Berry v. Hamlin, (Mo. App. 1924) 262 S. W. 464.
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tions formed for the purpose of, and engaged in the prosecution of
a general business over an extended period of time, as well as situ-
ations like that in Cecil v. Montgomery involving no more than
tenancy in common; or as in other cases, no more than a debtor-
creditor relationship.
Except for the latter class of cases, the use of a distinctive name
such as "joint adventure" is of no legal significance whatever. This
is simply because, at the present time, there is no law of joint
adventure. There is a law of partnership and that is all. The
law of partnership is applied, point for point to all joint adven-
ture controversies, and identical results are reached, under similar
circumstances, no matter whether the association is regarded as a
partnership or a joint adventure." In the tenancy in common,
debtor-creditor situations, rules of law are applied and results
65The recent case of Meinhard v. Salmon, (1928) 249 N. Y. 458, 164 N.
E. 545, discussed in 13 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 711, 715, seems worthy
of special comment in this connection. In both the opinion of Cardozo and
the dissenting opinion of Andrews the arrangement between Meinhard and
Salmon was referred to as a joint adventure. The referee who originally
heard the case found that there was no partnership but only a joint adventure
and on this theory concluded that a fiduciary relationship existed which made
it possible to hold that Salmon was a constructive trustee of the new lease
for the benefit of Meinhard as well as for himself. Both Cardozo and An-
drews adopted this finding in their opinions, but while Cardozo thought
that the new lease was embraced within the fiduciary relationship so es-
tablished, Andrews held that it was not, and this seems to be the sole ground
of difference between them.
Is the concept of joint adventure of any significance in this case? It is
submitted that it is not, for the following reasons:
(1) The arrangement was really a partnership. Salmon furnished
services and some capital, Meinhard furnished the rest of the capital; the
purpose was to conduct a business for twenty years at least-the business
of operating a valuable and productive building; they were to share profits
and losses; Salmon was to be the manager of the business. If Meinhard
received his share of the profits as profits, there were present all of the
elements of a partnership; if he did not, then the relation was one of debtor-
creditor.(2) But it made no difference so far as legal consequences were con-
cerned whether the arrangement was classified as a partnership or a joint
adventure. Therefore, the court took the path of least resistance and
adopted the finding that it was a joint adventure. The same result was
reached that would have been reached had it been regarded as a partnership,
and upon the same reasoning.
(3) It is conceded that therp may be a few cases in which courts have
employed the theory of joint advehture as a means of justifying a holding
that the parties occupied a fiduciary relationship, and in which no partner-
ship could be spelled out. This is not one of those cases. Furthermore, of
those cases it may be asked whether or not it was necessary to say "joint
adventure" as a condition to saying' "fiduciary relationship"?
(4) Cardozo, particularly, seemed to sense the insignificance of the
distinction drawn by the referee's finding. At three places in his opinion the
-parties are referred to as partners-in all others as co-adventurers. One
may be permitted a belief that this was not merely a slip of the pen on the
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reached somewhat different from those that would have followed
had the association been regarded as a partnership, but the signifi-
cance of calling the situation one of joint adventure instead of by
the more cumbersome name of tenancy in common plus a fiduciary
relationship ad hoc seems to lie wholly in convenience of designa-
tion. Such situations as these are quite different from partner-
ship situations, but no one has ever supposed that there is any
similarity between them.
It logically follows from this that there is no reason for dis-
tinguishing partnership and joint adventure situations by making
a separate classification for the latter, unless perhaps for pur-
poses of convenience in describing a kind of partnership, and even
so it is arguable that the English practice of calling it a special
partnership is more in harmony with a desire for simplicity and
uniformity in the classification of law and legal relationships.
But even if it was desirable to maintain the asserted distinction
between partnership and joint adventure, it seems obvious upon a
moment's reflection that such a distinction should not be predicated
entirely upon a difference in the purposes of the associations. In
view of the magnitude and complexity of many joint adventures, is
it not contradicting the facts to say that partnerships are business
organizations and they are not? It is submitted that if any divid-
ing line should be drawn between partnership and joint adventure,
for whatever purpose, the distinction should be predicated upon
differences in what the associations do and not upon the pre-organi-
zation declaration of ultimate purpose.
Paucity of adverse comment upon the concept of joint adven-
ture as an independent legal relationship supposedly governed by
laws to some extent different from those applicable to partnerships
is no doubt attributable in part to the fact that no litigant has been
seriously prejudiced by such a concept. Whether or not a retention
of this concept in future controversies will have such an effect is
not a matter about which the writer cares to make a guess. What
has been said here is merely an attempt to make an appraisal of the
present situation and show the fallacy of the current conception of
joint adventure.
part of one whose opinions are so uniformly perfect in the ?fine details.
At another place in his opinion the following language appears: "We
do not even need to determine what the effect would have been if the en-
terprise had been a partnership in the strict sense (italics ours) with active
duties of agency laid on each of the two adventurers." It seems permissible
to infer that he regarded this arrangement as a kind of partnership rather
than a legal relationship sui generis.
